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The impact of the Board of Directors’ composition on companies’ performance 
This paper studies the impact that the board of directors’ composition has on companies’ 
performance in the Italian market. The research has been carried out by using a sample of 10 Italian 
companies, across different market sectors, over a period of 10 years (2005-2014). 
The characteristics of the BoD taken into consideration are the following:  
board size, board diversity (% of female directors),  board independence and CEO duality.  
Results from the sample data collected concluded that these factors have a statistically significant 















1 – Introduction__________________________________________________ 
1.1 – Purpose and objectives 
Although the question of whether companies are managed in the best interest of shareholders is 
certainly not new, several financial scandals in the last decades have sparked a renewed interest in 
mechanisms that can limit managerial discretion, especially when it comes to sensitive decisions 
that affect the welfare of other economic agents in a company. In line with this trend, an ever-
growing amount of academic literature is trying to understand and assess the impact of corporate 
governance regulations and recommendations on the performance of a firm.  
This paper will focus in particular on the relationship between the characteristics of the board of 
directors and the performance of the firm in the Italian market, both at an operational and financial 
level. However, before discussing the results and methodology employed in this research, we will 
have an extensive look at the aforementioned academic literature that surrounds the topic, allowing 
us to lay the foundations for our findings. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the board 
characteristics discussed below will be the same aspects that will be chosen as regressors in our 
later analysis.  
1.2 - Literature review 
A general definition of the responsibilities of a board of directors can be found in Fama and Jensen 
(1983), who describe them as being both “the ratification of management decisions” as well as “the 
monitoring of management performance”. The first aspect that this paper takes into consideration is 
the size of the firm’s commitee, that is, the number of directors in a company’s board.  
Most of the academic research regarding the impact of board size focuses on the optimal number of 
directors  and the structure of corporate boards in the US market as a mechanism of value creation. 
This comes from the idea that a board approaching the optimum size is presumed to reduce the 





Large groups are often seen as less efficient in reaching agreements  as well as in monitoring top 
managers due to the increased coordination costs, thus leading to inferior firm performance (see for 
instance Kogan and Wallach, 1966).  
This theory is confirmed by a significant amount of research studies that examine boards in US 
companies, such as Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al (1998) for example, which lead to the 
concusion that a small board is more efficient. 
Furthermore, Guest (2009), who, by examining the impact of board size on firm performance for a 
large sample of UK listed firms for a period of over 20 years, found additional evidence that 
problems of poor communication and decision-making undermine the effectiveness of large boards. 
However, this view has recently been challenged by Dalton et al. (1999) and Coles et al. (2008) 
who claimed that larger boards may improve the performance of firms that are particularly complex 
or operate in multiple segments, thus requiring extensive advice.  
Another meaningful study was carried out by Bermig and Frick (2010) who analyzed the effects of 
supervisory board size and composition on the valuation & performance of all German firms listed 
in the DAX, MDAX and SDAX over the period 1998-2007.  
They used Tobin's Q ratio and the total shareholder return as measures of capital market 
performance while they employed ROE and ROIC as accounting measures to evaluate the 
companies’ operating performance.  
However, altough they find a significantly positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q 
ratio, the impact on the total shareholder return is negative. On the other side, with respect to the 
operating performance, their results were not statistically significant, suggesting that board size is 





Further results are reported by Malik et al. (2014), who examined the relationship between board 
size and firm performance in the Pakistani banking sector,  with their most prominent result being 
the positive relationship between board size and bank performance in this scenario.   
The second important aspect that should be discussed when it comes to the board composition is the 
presence and impact of independent directors in corporate boards. In this regard, Fama (1980) 
suggests that independent directors, also known as outside directors, can decrease the possibility of 
managerial collusion, since they introduce an additional source of corporate monitoring beside the 
usual monitoring performed by the board. Independent directors are professional members of the 
board who do not have any kind of relationship with the company’s business and do not own shares 
in the company. It is a widespread belief that the presence of independent directors improve the 
performance of a company by means of their objective view of the company's operations. In fact, 
outside directors  are disciplined by an external labour market which evaluates and sets the prices 
for their services according to their performance, drastically decreasing their incentives to seek their 
own interests.  
Papers that support this idea may be found in Weisbach (1988), who shows that CEOs of poorly 
performing firms are more likely to be replaced if firms have a majority of independent directors 
and Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani (1996), who find that there exists a positive relationship 
between the number of outside directors in a board and the probability that an outsider is appointed 
as CEO.  
Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) further support the argument by reporting higher-than-average increases 
in the value of firms after additional outside directors are appointed. Researchers also took into 
consideration the relationship between the number of independent directors and company’s 
takeovers. Such is the case of Cotter, Shivadsani and Zenner (1997) who analyzed the role of target 





They found that boards with a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance 
strategies that enhance shareholders’ wealth. 
Nevertheless, this general approach has been criticised, namely in its supposed monitoring 
objective. In fact critics, such as Mace (1986), claim that managers dominate boards by choosing 
outside directors and providing the information the latter are supposed to analyse. Bhagat and Black 
(1997) find no empirical evidence that the presence of outside directors in the board affects future 
firm performance while Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) find no significant association between 
performance and board structure in UK firms.   
In a comprehensive survey of the literature, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) indicate that no 
statistically significant impact of a firm’s number or percentage of outside directors on firm 
performance has yet been found.  
According to the authors, the major weakness of the available research about the impact of 
independent directors on firm performance lies in the fact that the degree of their independence is 
unobservable and their appointment is endogenous. In their survey of the most recent research, 
Coles et al. (2008) confirms the persistence of this issue and again fails to find a statistically 
significant influence of the board composition. 
In line with these conclusions, Raheja (2005) argues that "the optimal board structure is determined 
by the trade-off between maximizing the incentive for insiders to reveal their private information, 
minimizing coordination costs among outsiders and maximizing the ability of outsiders to reject 
inferior projects."  
Bermig and Frick (2010) further argue that “the missing link between board size, board 






In this respect, they note that, while most of the research on board effectiveness in the US yields 
mixed findings (for instance Morck et al. 1989 and Bange and Mazzeo 2004), Kaplan (1994) shows 
that German supervisory boards are effective in the sense that they quickly replace executives when 
firm performance has been poor or started to deteriorate. 
The third relevant aspect of the board composition not covered so far is the controversial matter of 
board diversity, and in particular, the percentage of female directors on the total number of the 
board members. In this regard, the extent of the available literature is smaller compared to the other 
aspects discussed above. Smith et al. (2005) analyzed data available for large Danish firms during 
the period 1993-2001 and found that the proportion of women in top management jobs and boards 
of directors tend to have positive effects on firm performance, even after checking for several other 
firm characteristics.  
Liu et al. (2014) focused instead on the Chinese market and reported that boards with three or more 
female directors have a stronger positive impact on firm performance than boards with two or fewer 
female directors. In a study of board diversity across 47 countries, Terjesen et al. (2015) found that 
firms with more female directors have higher firm performance by market and accounting 
measures. Furthermore, as an interesting point of connection between the topics of female 
representation and director independence, the authors also show that outside directors do not 
contribute to firm performance unless the board is gender diversified. 
Lastly, the final aspect that is analyzed in this paper regards the concept of CEO duality, that is, the 
practice of one person serving both as a firm’s CEO and board chairman.  From the theoretical point 
of view, this is a controversial point since different theories suggest different results. While the 
renowned Agency Theory states that CEO duality should negatively affect performance because it 
compromises the chairman’s role of monitoring the CEO; the Stewardship Theory claims instead 





A review of the empirical evidence supporting one or the other theory does not lead to certain 
answers. Donaldson and Davis (1991) find that ROE improved when combining, rather than by 
separating, the role-holders of the chair and CEO positions. Thus, their results fail to support the 
Agency theory and lend support to the Stewardship Theory. Similar conclusions are reached by the 
study of Yang and Zhao (2014), who report that duality firms outperform non-duality firms by 3-
4% when their competitive environments change. On the other hand, several other papers, such as 
Chen (2014) and Moscu (2013), do not find any significant effect of CEO duality on firm 
performance. 
In conclusion, this review has shown that there is no consensus in the academic literature regarding 
the relationship between board composition and firm performance. Thus, this paper will attempt to 
empirically assess such relationship by analysing 10 Italian companies listed on the national stock 
exchange, from 2005 to 2014. However, before turning our attention to the results of the analysis, 
the next section provides a brief overview of the evolution of corporate governance issues in recent 
years. 
2 - The surge of Corporate Governance___________________________                                                                
Attention to the topic of corporate governance and related regulations became widespread in Italy 
towards the end of the 1990s, following a wake of similar developments in all European countries 
that had been sparked by the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. This report was issued by a 
Corporate Governance Committee that had been established in the UK by the Financial Reporting 
Council, the Stock Exchange and several accountancy professionals in response to the growing 
concern related to the standards of financial reporting & accountability. The report sets out 
recommendations regarding the organization and structure of company’s boards in order to mitigate 





This event led to the development of codes of conduct and similar recommendation reports in 
several other European countries, such as the Riuz Cod and Codigo Olivencia in Spain, the Vienot 
Report in France and the German Corporate Governance Code.  
Such codes generally consisted in self-regulating best practices issued by entrepreneurs, 
professional associations and different institutions. However, it is worth noting that these best 
practices were added to national legislation only later on, as initially they were not complemented 
by legally binding rules. 
Alternately, in the United States, such regulatory process culminated in the adoption of a federal 
law in 2002, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, which  established new requirements for American public 
companies as a response to major accounting scandals such as the Enron case.  In particular, the Act 
defined responsibilities and criminal sanctions in case of misconduct for corporate boards, which 
were later complemented by regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
2.1 - Evolution of Corporate Governance in Italy  
With respect to the Italian context, the first committee for public companies’ corporate governance 
was created in 1999 by Borsa Italiana S.p.A, the authority managing the national stock exchange. 
This entity issued in the same year the first self-regulating Corporate Governance Code for listed 
companies (Codice Preda), which was later edited and expanded as time progressed. 
Italian business law provides for both “one-tier” (most commonly used) and “two-tier” corporate 
governance system allowing companies to decide which model to incorporate. Under the “one-tier” 
system, a company is governed by a single corporate board that undertakes both the managing and 
monitoring functions. On the other hand, under the second system, two separate boards operate 





The Italian Corporate Governance Code recommends that each board of directors should be 
composed of both executive and non-executive directors, as well as a minimum number of two 
independent, or outside, directors.  
In the case of companies listed on the FTSE MIB index, the benchmark stock market index for the 
Milan stock exchange, the Code suggests a number of independent directors equal to at least a third 
of the total number of directors.  
Directors of a company are defined in the Code as independent if they do not have any recent, direct 
or indirect, relationships with such company that could impair their autonomous judgment ability. 
According to data from an evaluation report published in 2014, the average board of directors 
across Italian listed companies is composed of 9.8 members, of which 2.7 executive directors, 3.1 
non-executive directors and 4 non-executive independent directors.  
Furthermore, 92% of listed companies comply with the recommendation of having boards with at 
least a third of independent directors, regardless of the stock market index to which they belong to 
(Assonime-Emittenti Titoli, 2014). 
 
Figure 1 shows the average number of directors in Italian listed companies by stock exchange 
index. Red corresponds to executive directors, green to non-executive directors and purple to 






Beside self-regulating codes of conduct, some rules of law regarding corporate governance were 
introduced in the Italian legislation. These rules addressed the issue of board diversity and the so-
called “pink quotas”, as women’s representation in boards of directors has come to be known in 
political debates.  
In fact, following the approval of bill number 120 on 12th July 2011, listed companies are now 
required to have directors of the “least represented” gender at least in a fifth of board positions in 
the first year and a third in the following years. With the introduction of this law, the number of 
female directors in listed companies has been steadily growing and at least one female director can 
be found in almost every company. Furthermore, women are more represented in the boards of 
high-capitalization companies, especially those belonging to the financial sector, while they are less 
present in industrial firms (Borsa Italiana, 2014).   
                                                                             
Table A shows the number of women directors in Italian listed companies and as the percentage out 
of total number of directors, per year (Consob, 2014). On the other hand, Table B shows the number 
of Italian listed companies in which at least a woman is represented in the board of directors and the 
percentage out of total number of listed companies, per year (Consob, 2014) 
3 – Data Description___________________________________________________ 
The core of this paper lies in an empirical research that attempts to study the impact of board 
composition on a firm performance, both at the operative and financial market level. Such effect 
will be evaluated by running statistical regressions on a sample of 10 Italian listed companies, with 






Table C shows the full list of the companies, divided by sector, that were taken into consideration in 
the analysis.  
The sample used for this research has the purpose to give a meaningful insight, as well as a cross-
section of the Italian market by taking into consideration different sectors of the economy. I chose 
five markets, which I deemed appropriate for the analysis as well as relevant for the Italian 
economy, and, for each of them, I chose two companies listed on the Italian national stock 
exchange, the Borsa Italiana, which best represents the sector they belong to. In this regard, it is 
worth mentioning that most of the chosen companies are also included in the FTSE MIB, which is 
the benchmark stock market index for Borsa Italiana, consisting of a capitalisation-weighted index 
of the 40 biggest companies chosen to represent 10 economic sectors. 
For each company, data on the composition of the board of directors was collected, namely the 
number of directors, female representation, independent directors and CEO duality. The impact of 
such factors was then assessed on the company’s operating performance (proxied by ROA) and 
stock market performance (proxied by Tobin’s q Ratio) by means of two panel data regressions, 
along with a set of control variables. Before discussing the results of the statistical model, the next 
paragraphs of the paper will present in further detail the data that have been used and the companies 
that have been chosen for the analysis. 
The first segment of the economy that was considered is the Energy market, which relates to the 
category of all corporations that produce and/or supply any form of energy.  
This includes companies involved in the exploration and development of oil & gas reserves, oil & 





For the purpose of this research, both Eni S.p.A. and Enel were chosen to represent this sector, 
given their importance and impact in this market. Eni is an Italian multinational oil & gas company, 
which is among the largest industrial companies in the world. Its name stands for "Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi", which roughly translates to “national hydrocarbons authority”, however, as time 
progressed, Eni expanded well beyond its original business, reaching and encompassing several 
other fields such as energy, nuclear power and mining among others.  
On the other hand, Enel is a multinational manufacturer and distributor of electricity & gas, 
operating in more than thirty countries. The company started as a public entity in the early 1960s 
and then privatized following the liberalization of the electricity market in Italy.  
The second sector taken into consideration is the automotive industry, which includes a wide range 
of companies and organizations involved in the design, development, manufacturing, marketing and 
selling of motor vehicles and its components. In this case, both Pirelli and Brembo were considered 
to best represent this industry.  
Pirelli is a multinational company and one of the largest tyre manufacturers in the world, having a 
vast network of distributors and retailers all over the world. 
The company has been sponsoring sport competitions since early 1900s and it is heavily involved as 
a tyre supplier in Formula one (F1). Brembo, on the other hand, is an Italian company that 
manufactures automotive brake systems, focusing mainly on high-performance vehicles. 
The third sector considered in our analysis is the Banking industry with Intesa San Paolo and 
Unicredit as representatives. Intesa Sanpaolo is a banking group formed in 2007 from the merger 
between Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI, overtaking Unicredit as the largest bank in the Italian 
market. It is worth mentioning that the group has adopted a dual corporate governance system 
where strategic management and control (governed by supervisory board) are separated from the 





Unicredit on the other hand, is an Italian global banking and financial services company with a vast 
network of more than fifty markets all over the world. 
The fourth sector that is analysed is the Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) industry, which is 
represented by both Campari and Geox.  Campari is an Italian company active since late 1860s in 
the branded beverage industry. It produces spirits, wines, and soft drinks.  
Under its name, it has Campari Bitter, Cinzano, SKYY Vodka and Aperol among others. 
Alternatively, Geox is an Italian company that manufactures breathable/waterproof shoes and 
clothing. 
The last sector to be considered is the Health Care industry with Recordati and Amplifon as 
representatives. Recordati is an Italian pharmaceutical group with international relevance, founded 
in 1926, which develops, produces and distributes pharmaceutical and chemical products. On the 
other hand, Amplifon is an Italian company that is involved in diagnosing, producing and 
distributing hearing equipment. 
It is important to highlight that except for the banking sector, most of the other companies chosen 
are family businesses, which is an important and common aspect of the Italian economy.  
The dataset used for the empirical analysis is thus a collection of panel data composed of 100 
observations, taken for 10 companies over a period of 10 years, from 2005 to 2014. For each 
company and for each year, data were collected for the following variables: 
 Return on Asset (ROA) - defined as . This is a standard measure of firm 
operating performance and it has been collected from the Bloomberg financial database (for 
ROA, the value in the tables below are already in percentage and multiplied by 100). 
 Tobin’s q Ratio - a measure of performance on stock markets that has been first 





It is defined as 
.  
In order to compute this ratio, market and book values for liabilities are assumed to be equal, 
hence reducing the formula to: .   
This ratio is a good method of estimating the fair value of a company. It was calculated by 
using data taken from Bloomberg. 
 Board size - the number of directors that sit in the company’s board of directors. 
 Female representation - the proportion of women directors out of the total number of 
directors sitting in the company’s board. 
 Independent directors - the proportion of outside directors (as defined by the Italian 
Corporate Governance Code) out of the total number of directors sitting in the company’s 
board. 
 CEO Duality, a dummy variable that takes value 1 in case the chairman of the board holds 
the position of CEO of the company, and 0 otherwise. 
 A set of dummy variables related to companies’ industries - these are five variables 
corresponding to the five sectors that are represented in the dataset (energy, automotive, 
banking, fast-moving consumer goods and health care). For each observation, each of these 
variables takes either value 1 or 0 according to whether the company belongs to that sector 
or not. 
 Total Assets - that is the total amount of assets owned by companies according to their 









A descriptive overview of the data follows. 
 
Table D - Summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. 
As the results suggest, the average return on companies’ assets is 5% with and average stock market 
q ratio of 1.95. On the other hand, the corporate governance indicators show that the average 
number of directors in companies’ boards is 12, only 10% of directors is female and more than half 
of directors (60%) are defined as independent.  However, a more useful descriptive analysis of data 
can be obtained by looking at summary statistics for each industry as seen in Table E below.   
Companies involved in the consumer goods and health care sectors seem to offer the greatest ROA 
on average (9.1% and 7.8% respectively), with banks and automotive companies displaying the 
lowest one. It has to be remarked, though, that benchmarks of satisfactory ROA ratios in the 
banking sector are considerably lower with respect to other industries and a value of 1% can already 
be considered very good as banks are highly leveraged. Regarding stock market performance as 
measured by q ratios, consumer goods and health care firms report again the highest values on 
average (3.4 and 2.6 respectively), while energy companies and banks exhibit the lowest ones. As 
for the board composition, the average number of directors is highest in banks, which report over 20 
members on their boards, and lowest in the health care sector, with only 8 directors. Conversely, 
health care companies have the highest average percentage of women directors at 16.7%, whereas 
firms in the energy sector report that only 3.6% of their directors are female on average. Banks also 
display the highest proportion of independent directors on average, while the consumer goods 





Finally, the CEO duality phenomenon, that is, the case in which the roles of board’s chairman and 
company’s CEO coincide, is a relatively rare occurrence in this sample. In fact, it appears to occur 
only in the four companies belonging to the health care and automotive sectors, and to be always 
limited to a few years in any case. In fact, no company exhibits CEO duality during every year of 







Table E - Summary statistics by industry for the main variables used in the analysis. 
4 - Regression model and results_______________________________ 
Two regression models were used in order to evaluate the effect of board of directors’ composition 
on firm performance: one is assessing the impact on operating performance as measured by return 
on assets (ROA) and the other one studying the impact on stock market performance as measured 
by Tobin’s q ratio.  
In particular, random-effect models are used for panel data due to the fact that any potential 
company-specific unobserved factors influencing firm performance are unlikely to be correlated 
with other regressors and they bias the resulting estimates. This assumption is supported by the 
result of the Hausman test that was performed after running both fixed-effect and random-effect 
regressions. As shown in the following table, the p-value associated to the test is very high, hence 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that a random-effects model provides a more efficient 
estimation. 
 
Table F - Hausman test results (Stata output). 







where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated,  is a vector of regressors,  is a constant 
term,  is a company-specific random element and  is a random error component. The subscript 
 denotes an observation for company  in year , with  and . 
 includes the following regressors, which have been explained in detail in the previous section of 
the paper: 
 Board of directors’ size  - variable named  
 % of female directors - variable named  
 % of independent directors - variable named  
 CEO duality - dummy variable named  
Furthermore,  includes also the following control variables, which were added in order to obtain 
more precise parameter estimates: 
 Dummy variables for each industry - named , , , 
. It is important to remark that the dummy for the health care sector is not 
included in the regressions in order to avoid collinearity. 
 Total company assets - variable named  
Based on what was discussed in the previous sections of this paper, when reviewing the existing 
corporate governance literature, I hypothesize the following findings, which I will then proceed to 
test by looking at the actual results of the two regression analyses: 
H1 - Larger corporate boards of directors should have a negative impact on performance, 
operating or financial. It is generally believed that large groups are less efficient in reaching 
agreements and in monitoring top managers due to higher coordination costs, thus leading to 





H2 - A higher proportion of women directors in corporate boards should positively affect 
performance, as shown by recent literature on the topic. 
H3 - A higher proportion of independent directors in corporate boards should positively 
affect performance.  
The literature, as a matter of fact, suggests that outside directors can decrease the possibility 
of managerial collusion, since they introduce an additional source of corporate monitoring 
beside the usual monitoring performed by the board. 
H4 - While the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance has long been discussed 
without coming to any clear conclusion, I expect the negative effect described by the 
Agency Theory, explained in the literature review, to prevail over the positive one of 
Stewardship Theory. That is, I expect that combining the roles of CEO and board’s 
chairman within the same person will lead to lower returns since this compromises the board 
chair’s role of CEO monitoring. 
The results of the first regression model, with return on assets (ROA) as dependent variable, are 
shown below in Table G. 
We can observe that the size of the board of directors and the presence of women directors or 
independent directors all have statistically significant influence on companies’ measures of return 
on assets. In particular, larger boards of directors lead, on average, to worse operating performance, 
whereas a higher proportion of outside directors has a positive effect and increases firm 
performance on average. Regarding the proportion of female directors, the estimated coefficient 
seems to suggest a negative impact on ROA. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that this analysis 
concerns a very limited segment of economic activity and the result of this regression can hardly be 
an indication of a generalized effect. 
This is further shown by the existing literature, discussed in the previous section, which supports 





Thus, I am not suggesting to take the regression’s result into consideration for policy making as I 
strongly believe that gender diversity is a crucial component in a company’s success. 
Another interesting and statistically significant result regards the phenomenon of CEO duality.  
The resulting coefficient estimate exhibits a positive effect on firm’s ROA, hence implying that the 
outcome predicted by the so-called Stewardship Theory may prevail over the Agency Theory as 
discussed in the literature review section of this paper.  
As for industry-specific effects measured by sector dummy variables, energy companies seem to 
exhibit the lowest ROA. However, it is not possible to assess sector-specific effects, if any, due to 
the fact that all other industry dummies do not yield statistically significant estimates. 
The results of the second regression model, concerning the effects on stock market performance as 
measured by Tobin’s q ratio, are presented in Table H. Unfortunately, in this model the only 
statistically significant result among board composition variables is related to the presence of 
independent directors. This confirms what it has been found already in the case of return on ROA, 
that is, a higher proportion of outside directors in a company’s board improves firm stock market 
value relative to book value. Furthermore, companies in the energy sector seem to report lower than 
average financial market returns in this case as well, but once again, it is not possible to assess 






                                      
                                                          
Table G - Regression parameter estimates (dependent variable: return on assets). 
Table H - Regression parameter estimates (dependent variable: Tobin’s q ratio). 
 
5 – Conclusions_______________________________________________ 
In conclusion, within the sample of the listed companies that were selected during the period 2005-
2014, the regression analyses discussed above show that a greater presence of independent directors 
in companies’ boards improve returns to firms, both in terms of operating and stock market 






Moreover, larger boards of directors and higher proportions of female directors negatively affect 
firms’ operating performance; however these latter factors lack evidence of significant impact on 
financial market performance. Therefore, at least in partial terms, regression results also confirm 
hypothesis H1, but reject hypothesis H2.  
Regarding  CEO/chairman duality, its occurrence has a positive influence on operating 
performance, thus suggesting a prevalence of stewardship theory over agency theory and rejecting 
hypothesis H4. Nevertheless, also for this variable, no significant effect is found on stock 
performance. As for other factors, such as industry-specific effects, their relationship with company 
performance cannot be precisely assessed due to a lack of statistical significance.  
Due to a lack of statistical significance in several parts of this paper’s analysis, further research is 
needed in order to estimate with greater accuracy the magnitude and direction of the effects that 
were studied. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that such results are hardly representative of the Italian economy as 
a whole and their external validity is thus not guaranteed.   
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